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CHAPTER 9
 MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE
Bruno Demeyere and Tom Ruys*
) e present chapter summarily + eshes out the substantive implications of what 
AP I labels, in Article 35, one of the basic rules when it comes to “ means and 
methods of warfare”: “In any armed con+ ict, the right of the Parties to the 
con+ ict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited”.1
Section 1 of the present chapter deals with the basic principles underpinning 
the legal framework applicable to “means of warfare”, whereas section 2 deals 
with a number of “methods of warfare”. While neither concept is authoritatively 
de/ ned in treaty law, there is consensus that the concept of “means” of warfare 
refers to  weapons, as well as  weapons launch and delivery systems.2 By contrast, 
the concept of “methods” of warfare, generally refers to particular tactics 
resorted to in warfare, including the modalities according to which a belligerent 
party employs the  weapons at its disposal.3
Historically, this part of the law of armed con+ ict squarely belongs to the 
so-called “law of the Hague”, i.e. rules regulating military operations among 
 combatants, and proscribing how  combatants are entitled to conduct hostilities. 
In short: how does the law of armed con+ ict conceive of a lawful / ght between 
the parties to the con+ ict?
* ) e views expressed in this article are strictly personal to the authors. ) e usual disclaimers 
apply.
1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12  August 1949 and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Con+ icts of 8  June 1977 (hereina< er AP I) 
(Compendium 121).
2 See: K. Hulme, “ Weapons”, in N.D. White and C. Henderson (eds.), Research Handbook on 
International Con! ict and Security Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013, 315–341, 319 (with 
references). Consider also: NWP 1–14 M, Chapter 9 (referring to “ Conventional  weapons and 
 weapons systems”); W.H. Boothby,  Weapons and the Law of Armed Con! ict, Oxford, OUP, 
2009, 4 (“) e phrase ‘means of warfare’ means, for the purposes of this book, all  weapons, 
 weapons platforms, and associated equipment used directly to deliver force during hostilities” 
(emphasis added)). ) e present chapter only deals with the narrower category of “ weapons”.
3 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds.),  International Committee of the  Red 
Cross Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8  June, 1977, to the Geneva Conventions, 
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1. MEANS OF WARFARE
) e present section is divided in three parts. First, attention is devoted towards 
an assessment of the cardinal  principle underpinning the law in this area, i.e. 
the prohibition of using  weapons designed, or of a nature to cause, so-called 
super+ uous injury or  unnecessary su{ ering. In the second part, reference is 
made to those treaty provisions that seek to explicitly outlaw particular types of 
 weapons altogether. Finally, in the third part, we look at the e{ ect on the legality 
of  weapons of other applicable rules, in particular those belonging to the realm 
of proscriptions pertaining to the conduct of hostilities.
1.1. SUPERFLUOUS INJURY OR  UNNECESSARY 
SUFFERING
) e  principle of super+ uous injury or  unnecessary su{ ering is one  principle 
that is, at the conceptual level, more than / rmly established in the law of armed 
con+ ict. Dating back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, its most recent 
authoritative formulation can be found in Article 35(2) AP I, which proclaims 
that “[i]t is prohibited to employ  weapons, projectiles and material and methods 
of warfare of a nature to cause super+ uous injury or  unnecessary su{ ering”. In 
1996, the International Court of Justice identi/ ed this as a norm of  customary 
international law, while also recognising it as “one of the cardinal principles 
of international humanitarian law” (together with the rules concerning 
 distinction).4
Before proceeding any further, it is important to keep in mind that the mere 
fact that a weapon has been explicitly addressed (restricted or prohibited) in a 
treaty, does not automatically mean that the weapon in question would equally 
be prohibited on the basis of Article  35(2) AP I: the assessment as to whether 
a particular weapon quali/ es as being “of a nature to cause super+ uous injury 
or  unnecessary su{ ering”, is a separate one.5 ) e phrase is conventionally 
explained as entailing that su{ ering will be considered unnecessary when no 
 military necessity can be expected from a certain action, as well as in situations 
where the su{ ering is clearly excessive in relation to the  military advantage to be 
expected from resorting to the weapon in question.6
4 ICJ, Legality of the # reat or  Use of  Nuclear  Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8  July 1996, ICJ 
Rep. 1996, §§78–79 (Compendium 913). J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge, CUP, 2005, Rule 70 at 237 
(“) e use of  means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause super+ uous injury 
or  unnecessary su{ ering is prohibited”).
5 W.H. Boothby, supra note 2, 60.
6 See, e.g., G.D. Solis, # e law of armed con! ict, Cambridge, CUP, 2010, 270–271; S. Oeter, 
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It follows from the foregoing that the application of the  principle presupposes 
some form of comparison, or a “balancing” test (“in relation to”). Some even 
speak about “ proportionality” in this context,7 yet one must of course be 
cautious not to confuse the prohibition of  unnecessary su{ ering, intended to 
restrain the su{ ering in+ icted on opposing  combatants, with the  principle of 
 proportionality, as understood in the law of targeting (see infra), which relates to 
harm to  civilians.8
For purposes of the balancing test, two factors seem decisive. ) e / rst 
concerns the availability of alternative means or methods which would cause 
less harm while leading to similar military gains. ) is re+ ects the interpretation 
of the ICJ which associated  unnecessary su{ ering with the occurrence of harm 
“greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate  military objectives”.9 ) e 
second factor concerns the degree of su{ ering to be expected from the use of 
a particular weapon. ) e problem here is that it is o< en di  cult to quantify 
su{ ering in medical terms.10 In the reading of those arguing in favour of a 
balancing /  proportionality test, injuries can only be super+ uous either if they 
are not justi/ ed by any requirement of  military necessity, or if the injuries 
normally caused by the weapon or projectile are manifestly disproportionate 
to the  military advantage that can reasonably be expected from the use of the 
weapon.11
No matter how di  cult (even: impossible) it may be to “scienti/ cally” 
quantify the precise operational implications of this rule, one thing is clear: 
two pillars underpin the prohibition to employ  weapons of a nature to cause 
super+ uous injury or  unnecessary su{ ering, namely the core principles of 
humanity and  military necessity. ) e former has been argued to mean that 
capture is preferable to wounding an  enemy and wounding him better than 
killing him; that wounds in+ icted should be as light as possible and that wounds 
Humanitarian Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, OUP, 2013, 125–126 (referring to “the use of  weapons 
and  methods of combat whose foreseeable harm would be clearly excessive in relation to 
the lawful  military advantage intended”); Y. Dinstein, # e conduct of hostilities under the 
law of international armed con! ict, 2nd ed., Cambridge, CUP, 2010, 64; B.M. Carnahan, 
“ Unnecessary su{ ering, the  Red Cross and tactical  laser  weapons”, 18 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 1995–96, 713; J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 240.
7 E.g., M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf and M. Eaton, New rules for victims of armed 
con! icts: commentary on the two 1977 protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
) e Hague, Martinus Nijho{ , 1982, 196. Compare: Y. Dinstein, supra note, 65.
8 G.D. Solis, supra note 6, 270.
9 ICJ, Legality of the # reat or  Use of  Nuclear  Weapons, supra note 4, §78 (emphasis added).
10 In the 1990s, the ICRC set up the so-called SIrUS project with a view to developing objective 
standards to assess (unnecessary) su{ ering. ) e project was, however, withdrawn prematurely 
in 2001. Further: R.M. Coupland and P. Herby, “Review of the legality of  weapons: a new 
approach: the SIrUS Project”, 81 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 1999, 583–592; D.M. Verchio, “Just say 
no! ) e SIrUS project: well intentioned, but unnecessary and super+ uous” 51 Air Force L. Rev. 
2001, 183.
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should cause the least possible pain.12 ) e law of armed con+ ict, however, 
inherently takes into account the requirement of  military necessity, and it is only 
in the dialectical interrelationship between both core principles that the true 
thrust of these rules can be fully understood.  Military necessity, indeed, permits 
a party to a con+ ict to use only that degree and that kind of force, not otherwise 
prohibited by the law of armed con+ ict, as is required to achieve the legitimate 
purpose of the armed con+ ict, namely the complete or partial submission of 
the  enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure 
of life and resources.13 One will / nd varying accounts regarding the precise 
boundaries of the law in this area of study depending upon which side of the 
“humanitarian-principles-versus-military-necessity equilibrium” a particular 
reading is situated.
Although quite a number of scholars14 agree that the concept of  unnecessary 
su{ ering may require a careful balance to be struck between the competing 
principles of humanity and  military necessity, views di{ er as to the relevant 
criteria used to determine whether the prohibition has been violated. Two factors 
that / gure inter alia in the ICRC customary study are the tendency of a weapon 
to render death inevitable or to result in permanent disability.15
In all, despite its well-established customary nature, it must be acknowledged 
that little practical operational guidance can be deduced from this prohibition. 
) e true gist of the rule, in speci/ c terms, can however be found in numerous 
treaties that have been adopted where, for speci/ c  weapons, this prohibition 
clearly was the underlying factor motivating States to agree to an outright 
prohibition of a particular weapon. Examples thereof can be found in the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol. While, as previously indicated, no particular prohibition 
in treaty law would automatically qualify under this customary prohibition, 
several treaties explicitly refer to the  principle as one of its underlying 
motivations.16
) e implication of the phraseology must, therefore, be clearly understood, 
and this in light of the general trade-o{  inherent in any rule of the law of armed 
con+ ict, i.e. the mere fact that a certain weapon causes considerable su{ ering 
does not in itself make it an unlawful weapon per se. It is, at the current juncture, 
12 J. Pictet, Le droit humanitaire et la protection des victimes de la guerre, Leiden, Sijtho{ , 1973, 
34.
13 UK Ministry of Defence, # e Manual of the Law of Armed Con! ict, Oxford, OUP, 2004, 
21–22.
14 See supra note 6. ) is view is equally propounded in the J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-
Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 240–241.
15 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 241. But see e.g., Y. Dinstein, 
supra note 6, 65 ( warning against confusing the lethal character of a weapon with the 
question concerning  unnecessary su{ ering).
16 See e.g., the preamble of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain  Conventional  Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 
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that the pendulum of the assessment may swing and that requirements of 
 military necessity will play a key role in determining the illegality – on the basis 
of this general rule – of any particular weapon.17 In practice, States are generally 
reluctant to accept the idea that a weapon would be unlawful purely on the basis 
of this prohibition, implying that one needs a separate treaty rule to that e{ ect.18 
) is observation may be disappointing to those who are new to the study of the 
law of armed con+ ict. Yet, in order to properly understand and appreciate the 
latter’s intricacies, it must be kept in mind that this legal framework re+ ects, and 
is limited by, States’ perception of their own interests and is not determined by 
individual citizens wishing to outlaw armed con+ ict altogether.19
Divergence of opinion exists as to whether the prohibition of / elding 
 weapons designed, or of a nature, to cause super+ uous injury or  unnecessary 
su{ ering merely serves as a guiding  principle for the conclusion of speci/ c 
 weapons treaties, or whether it has any autonomous value – in other words: 
whether the rule of Article 35(2) AP I is in itself su  cient, absent speci/ c treaty 
law, to render the use of a particular weapon illegal.20
) e divergence of opinion is re+ ected in Article  8(2)(b)(xx) ICC Statute, 
which lists as a war crime the employment of means or methods of warfare 
“which are of a nature to cause super+ uous injury or  unnecessary su{ ering […] 
provided that such  weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are 
the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to [the] 
Statute”.21 To date, such an annex listing speci/ c  weapons does not exist, hence 
leaving this provision impossible to apply. Conversely, the ICC Statute subjects 
only the use of a limited number of  weapons to possible individual criminal 
 liability and, in the initial version at least, then only in the case of international 
armed con+ icts.22
17 Y. Dinstein, # e conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed con! ict, 1st ed., 
Cambridge, CUP, 2004, 59: “A weapon is proscribed only if it causes injury or su{ ering that 
can be avoided, given the military constraints of the situation”. For a detailed discussion of 
the  principle, see W.H. Boothby, supra note 2, 55–68.
18 Cfr. also the discussion in J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 
242–243: “[…] views di{ er as to whether the rule itself renders a weapon illegal or whether a 
weapon is illegal only if a speci/ c treaty or customary rule prohibits its use”.
19 F. Kalshoven, “Arms, Armaments and International Law”, 191 Recueil des Cours 183 (1985-
II), 288.
20 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 242; Y. Dinstein, supra 
note 6, 67.
21 Art. 8(2)(b)(xx) Rome Statute of the  International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (hereina< er ICC Statute) (Compendium 580) (emphasis added).
22 Art.  8(b)(xvii); (xviii) and (xix) of the ICC Statute, respectively related to “employing 
 poison or poisoned  weapons”; “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices”; and “employing bullets which expand or + atten 
easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover 
the core or is pierced with incisions”. At the 2010 Review Conference, an amendment (not 
further discussed here) was adopted with a view to making some of these  war crimes equally 
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) e better view seems to be that while the  principle of  unnecessary su{ ering 
cannot render a particular weapon illegal per se, it does provide a framework to 
assess the legality of its use in a particular situation. ) is reasoning conforms 
to the ICJ’s approach in the  Nuclear  Weapons Advisory Opinion. It is also 
supported by the fact that the ICTY Statute identi/ es the employment of 
 weapons calculated to cause  unnecessary su{ ering as a violation of the laws or 
customs of war.
Finally, as States are o< en unwilling to discard newly developed  weapons 
in which they have invested great amounts of time and money, AP I also 
provides for a more proactive obligation in Article  36 AP I. ) e latter Article 
proclaims that States studying, developing or acquiring a new “weapon, means 
or method of warfare” are under the obligation “to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited” by AP I or by 
any other applicable rule of international law (such as the prohibition regarding 
 unnecessary su{ ering). ) is obligation is to be implemented at the national level 
of each individual State, i.e. no multilateral mechanism exists in this regard. 
Only a few States23 have actually developed procedures in order to operationalise 
this provision at the domestic level24 and ostensibly conduct Article 36 reviews 
behind closed doors. If properly implemented, Article 36(2) AP I should make 
a valuable contribution to the goal of eradicating unlawful  means and methods 
of warfare, especially since – arguably – the determination under Article 36 AP 
I should not be conducted in the abstract, but be of a contextual nature.25 To 
this end, the ICRC has developed an informal, non-binding guidance document 
setting out its views as to how to interpret and operationalise this provision.26
Having dealt with the basic  principle underpinning the law of armed con+ ict 
pertaining to weaponry, the next two parts of this section seek to provide further 
clarity as to the way in which States have agreed to regulate this subject from the 
angle of the law of armed con+ ict.27 Here, it is important to keep in mind a two-
step approach: / rst, there are a limited number of  weapons which have explicitly 
been outlawed (section 1.2). ) e fact that most  weapons have not been subject 
23 For a list of countries concerned (dating from 2006), see ICRC, “A Guide to the Legal  Review 
of  New  Weapons,  Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article  36 of 
Additional Protocol I of 1997”, 88 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 2006, 931, footnote 8.
24 For further background on AP I, Art. 36, see I. Daoust, R. Coupland and R. Ishoey, “New 
Wars,  New  Weapons? ) e obligation of States to assess the legality of  means and methods 
of warfare”, 84 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 2002, 397; J. McClelland, “) e Review of  Weapons 
in Accordance with Article  36 of Additional Protocol I”, 85 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 2003, 397. 
See also W.H. Boothby, supra note 2, 340–352; A. Backstrom and I. Henderson, “New 
capabilities in warfare: an overview of contemporary technological developments and the 
associated legal and engineering issues in Article  36  Weapons Reviews”, 94 Int’l Rev.  Red 
Cross 2012, 483–514.
25 J.D. Fry, “Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave 
Combat and International Humanitarian Law”, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 2006, 453.
26 For the full text thereof, see ICRC, supra note 23, 931.
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to such an explicit, outright prohibition does not necessarily mean that they are 
lawful, however. Paragraph 3 deals with this second step in the analysis. Clearly, 
the law of weaponry is a particularly sensitive subject for many States.28
1.2. EXPLICITLY PROHIBITED  WEAPONS
Given the number of treaties in this area, it is beyond the ambition of this 
contribution to provide an exhaustive overview as to all types of  weapons that 
have been subjected to a speci/ c and explicit prohibition. As always in law, one 
needs to be very careful in interpreting these treaties. Every single time, the 
actual scope of application of the treaty will entirely depend on the way in which 
the weapon in question has been de/ ned. It thus becomes important to inquire 
in respect of which  weapons speci/ cally States have consented that it can no 
longer be used.
Historically, among the oldest examples that can be cited in this area is 
the prohibition on the use of  poison and poisoned  weapons (Article  23(a) of 
the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to 
Hague Convention IV (1907) (herea< er: the Hague Regulations)29, as well as 
the prohibition of particular types of explosive bullets (contained in the 1868 
St. Petersburg Declaration30), and the prohibition of bullets that expand or 
+ atten easily in the human body (see Article 3 of the 1899 Hague Declaration IV 
concerning Expanding Bullets).31
As to non- conventional  weapons, the thrust of the rules relating to  biological 
 weapons is nowadays found in the 1972  Biological  Weapons Convention.32 ) is 
28 For an explanation, see W. Hays Parks, “ Means and Methods of Warfare”, 38 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 2006, 501.
29 For a discussion on the precise meaning of the terms “ poison and poisoned  weapons”, see 
J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 251–254.
30 Sixth paragraph: “) e Contracting Parties engage mutually to renounce, in case of war 
among themselves, the employment by their military or naval troops of any projectile 
of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or 
in+ ammable substances”. Further: T. Ruys, “) e XM25 Individual Airburst Weapon System: 
A ‘Game Changer’ for the (Law on the) Battle/ eld? Revisiting the Legality of Explosive 
Projectiles under the Law of Armed Con+ ict”, 45  Israel L. Rev. 2012, 401–430.
31 ) ese are commonly referred to as “dum dum” bullets: see Declaration IV, Concerning 
Expanding Bullets, the / rst operative paragraph of which reads: “) e contracting Parties 
agree to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or + atten easily in the human body, 
such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entire cover the core or is pierced 
with incisions” (1907 UKTS No. 32). Further: A. Vanheusden, W. Hays Parks and W.H. 
Boothby, “) e use of expanding bullets in military operations: examining the Kampala 
consensus”, 50 Rev. Dr. Mil. & Dr. Guerre 2011, 535–556.
32 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin  Weapons and on ) eir Destruction of 10 April 1972 
(Compendium 385). Further: J. Goldblat, “) e  Biological  Weapons Convention – An 
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Convention builds on the 1925 prohibition on asphyxiating gases33 – which 
was already at the time understood to equally cover “bacteriological methods 
of warfare”. Regarding the activities it covers, the 1972 Convention goes much 
beyond the scope of the 1925 prohibition, which only related to the use of such 
gases, by additionally including matters of development, production, stockpiling 
or “otherwise acquir[ing] or retain[ing] these  weapons” (Article 1).
As for  chemical  weapons, the 1993  Chemical  Weapons Convention is obviously 
the basic reference document.34 ) e Convention contains a very comprehensive 
overview of the type of activities that are prohibited, in addition to a prohibition 
pertaining to their “use”. Moreover, an elaborate and detailed regime geared 
towards their destruction, under international oversight by the Organisation for 
the Prohibition of  Chemical  Weapons, an intergovernmental organisation based 
in ) e Hague, is included within the agreement. Article  1(5) of the  Chemical 
 Weapons Convention prohibits the “use of riot control agents as a method of 
warfare”, once the threshold of the law of armed con+ ict has been crossed. Below 
that threshold, however, their use (such as for example tear gas) may be lawful, 
i.e. as a matter of  law  enforcement to disperse a rioting crowd.35 Although the 
prohibition on the use of  chemical  weapons as a method of warfare now forms 
part of  customary international law,36 chemical agents have occasionally been 
used in armed con+ ict both before and a< er 1993. During the  Iraq- Iran wars in 
the 1980s,  Iraq used  chemical  weapons on a large scale; more recently,  chemical 
 weapons have been used in the context of the Syrian  civil war.37
) e landscape of treaties restricting or prohibiting speci/ c  weapons is much 
broader than those dealt with so far. Most prominently, a series of speci/ c treaties 
prohibiting particular  weapons has been adopted under the framework of the 
umbrella agreement of the 1980 Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain  Conventional  Weapons Which may be Deemed to be 
33 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17  June 1925 (Compendium 
381). Further: J.N. Moore, “Rati/ cation of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological 
Warfare: A Legal and Political Analysis”, 58 Virginia L. Rev. 1972, 419–509.
34 Further: W. Krutsch, E.P.J. Myjer and R. Trapp (eds.), # e  Chemical  Weapons Convention: 
a commentary, Oxford, OUP, 2014, 728; M. Bothe (ed.), # e New  Chemical  Weapons 
Convention:  implementation and prospects, ) e Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 613.
35 For a further discussion, see W.H. Boothby, supra note 2, 135–136.
36 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 259.
37 In particular, an attack with  chemical  weapons near Damascus in August 2013 resulting in 
several hundreds of civilian casualties led to widespread international indignation and even 
calls for a military  intervention against the Syrian regime. Eventually, however, following 
a Russian diplomatic initiative, threats of military  intervention were averted a< er the 
Syrian regime agreed to join the CWC and have its  chemical  weapons stockpiles destroyed 
under OPCW supervision. “Framework for Elimination of Syrian  Chemical  Weapons”, 
14  September 2013, annexed to OPCW Doc. EC-M-33/NAT.1, available at www.opcw.org/
/ leadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33nat01_e_.pdf [accessed on 16 July 2015]; UNSC Resolution 
2118 of 27  September 2013, UN Doc. S/RES/2118. Further: T. Ruys and N. Verlinden, 
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Excessively Injurious or to Have  Indiscriminate E{ ects.38 Under this framework 
agreement, a series of “protocols” have subsequently been adopted separately, 
notably related to  non-detectable fragments39; the use of  mines,  booby-traps 
and other devices40; the use of  incendiary  weapons41; blinding  laser  weapons,42 
and explosive remnants of war.43 As previously indicated, for each of these 
instruments, it is crucial to carefully assess the way the weapon concerned 
is de/ ned. It is this  de/ nition, indeed, which determines each document’s 
precise scope of applicability.  Negotiations have been ongoing within the CCW 
framework for several years on the possible conclusion of further instruments 
dealing speci/ cally with “ mines other than  anti-personnel  mines”, or with lethal 
autonomous  weapons.44
Another prominent example of a treaty prohibiting particular types of 
 weapons is the 1997 Ottawa Convention on  Anti-Personnel  Mines,45 which 
contains a very comprehensive set of prohibitions (Article 1 Ottawa Convention) 
related to a variety of activities States can no longer undertake in relation to 
these  mines.46 ) is Convention is a prominent example which demonstrates 
the importance of clearly understanding the  de/ nition agreed upon in the text. 
Article  2(1) Ottawa Convention de/ nes the concept “anti-personnel mine” in 
a very precise manner, the crucial term of the  de/ nition being “designed to”, 
which does exclude a number of  mines from being covered by this  de/ nition.47 
Apart from imposing a general ban on the use of  anti-personnel  mines 
38 CCW, supra note 16.
39 Protocol I on  Non-Detectable Fragments of 10  October 1980 (Compendium 402): “It is 
prohibited to use any weapon the primary e{ ect of which is to injure by fragments which in 
the human body  escape detection by  X-rays”.
40 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Mines,  Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices of 10 October 1980, amended in 1996 (Compendium 402). Further: M.J. Matheson, 
“) e revision of the  Mines Protocol”, 91 Am. J. Int’ l L. 1997, 158–167.
41 Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Incendiary  Weapons of 10 October 
1980 (Compendium 409). Further: W. Hays Parks, “) e Protocol on  Incendiary  Weapons”, 
279 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 1990, 535–550.
42 Protocol IV on Blinding  Laser  Weapons of 13 October 1995 (Compendium 410). Further: L. 
Doswald-Beck, “New Protocol on Blinding  Laser  Weapons”, 36 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 1996, 
272–299.
43 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of 28 November 2003 (Compendium 410). Further: 
L. Maresca, “A new Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War: the history and negotiation of 
Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain  Conventional  Weapons”, 856 Int’l Rev.  Red 
Cross 2004, 815–835.
44 For the latest information on these  negotiations, see the CCW website: www.unog.
ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocum
ent [accessed on 16 July 2015].
45 Full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
 Transfer of  Anti-Personnel  Mines and on ) eir Destruction of 18  September 1997 
(Compendium 450). Further: S. Malsen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties Vol. 1, # e 
Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production, and  transfer of  anti-personnel 
 mines and on their destruction, 2nd ed., Oxford, OUP, 2005, 706.
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(Article 1), the Convention also contains sweeping obligations on the destruction 
of existing stockpiles of  anti-personnel  mines and on the destruction of such 
 mines in mined areas (Articles 4–5). Despite 162 States having signed up to the 
Convention, several important players, including  China,  Russia and the United 
States, have so far refused to join. In 2014, the United States nonetheless decided 
to “align” its policy to the key requirements under the Ottawa Convention, inter 
alia by announcing that it would no longer use  anti-personnel  mines outside the 
Korean Peninsula.48
Pursuant to an international advocacy campaign, stemming from both civil 
society and a number of States, the international community concluded a treaty 
on the prohibition of  cluster munitions in 2008,49 inspired by observations from 
certain armed con+ icts in the years preceding those e{ orts. While the treaty 
entered into force in 2010, it must be pointed out that a number of militarily 
important States (including  Israel and the United States) rather strongly oppose 
this text.
Finally, as far as  nuclear  weapons are concerned – a topic going far beyond 
the con/ nes of the present article – within international law and policy these 
have traditionally mostly been dealt with from a  non-proliferation, arms control 
and disarmament angle.50 ) e treatment of  nuclear  weapons at the international 
level, regarding their regulation under the law of armed con+ ict, however, has 
traditionally been much thinner. Slowly, this has started to change in that, 
since 2013, certain States have started to approach the discussion on the topic 
of  nuclear  weapons also from the angle of their humanitarian impact. Be that 
as it may, so far at least, contrary to what is the case for biological and  chemical 
 weapons, there is no treaty regulating the  use of  nuclear  weapons. Quite a 
number of States – and it must be noted that these were not only States with 
 nuclear  weapons capabilities – made statements upon ratifying AP I in order to 
indicate that it was their view that AP I only addressed  conventional  weapons.51 
48 United States White House, O  ce of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: changes to U.S. anti-
personnel landmine policy”, 23 September 2014, available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
o  ce/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy [accessed on 16 July 
2015].
49 Convention on  Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008 (Compendium 466). Further: G. Nystuen 
and S. Casey-Maslen (eds.), # e Convention on  Cluster Munitions: a commentary, Oxford, 
OUP, 2010, 864.
50 Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear  Weapons of 1  July 1968 (Compendium 382). 
Further: D.H. Joyner, Interpreting the nuclear  non-proliferation treaty, Oxford, OUP, 2011, 
184; G. Nystuen, S. Casey-Maslen and A. Golden Bersagel (eds.),  Nuclear  Weapons 
under international law, Cambridge, CUP, 2014, 503.
51 See for example the statement made by the  United Kingdom upon rati/ cation of AP I: “It 
continues to be the understanding of the  United Kingdom that the rules introduced by the 
Protocol apply exclusively to  conventional  weapons without prejudice to any other rules of 
international law applicable to other types of  weapons. In particular the rules so introduced 
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In the words of Frits Kalshoven, the situation can be aptly summarised as 
follows:
) e sobering conclusion must be that the wartime  use of  nuclear  weapons is not 
categorically prohibited under the existing rules of positive international law. Yet 
to be lawful any such use must respect certain principles on the protection of the 
civilian population from the e{ ects of hostilities.52
) us, while nothing in AP I explicitly addresses, let alone prohibits, the  use 
of  nuclear  weapons, their use will always be subject to the general rules and 
principles of the law of armed con+ ict, such as – among others – the  principle 
of  distinction and the  principle of  proportionality (for a discussion thereof, see 
infra and Chapter 7 of this volume). ) is view was a  rmed by the ICJ in its 
1996 Advisory Opinion on  Nuclear  Weapons.53 ) us, despite the absence of a 
convention speci/ cally dealing with their use in the course of an armed con+ ict, 
States – including those with  nuclear  weapons capabilities – do not deny that the 
 use of  nuclear  weapons is fully subject to the rules of the law of armed con+ ict.
While acknowledging that, in most instances, the  use of  nuclear  weapons will 
be  indiscriminate (for the meaning of this notion, see the next paragraph), the 
Court has neither excluded, nor explicitly recognised that the use of particular 
types of  nuclear  weapons (such as particular species of so-called tactical  nuclear 
 weapons) may be lawful in particular circumstances. Ultimately, the Court 
could not bring itself to conclude that public international law would contain 
an outright categorical prohibition. Irrespective of the aspects of the Advisory 
Opinion which exclusively deal with  jus in bello considerations, it is particularly 
regrettable that the Court has leapt towards the confusion of  jus ad bellum and 
 jus in bello,54 thereby – quite surprisingly – itself violating one of the basic tenets 
of international security law, i.e. the strict separation of  jus ad bellum versus  jus 
in bello.
) e preceding paragraphs have merely o{ ered a cursory and incomplete 
overview of the existing treaties which contain a prohibition of particular types 
52 F. Kalshoven, supra note 19, 287.
53 ICJ, Legality of the # reat or  Use of  Nuclear  Weapons, supra note 4, §226, with at §256: 
“) e Court not having found a conventional rule of general scope, nor a customary rule 
speci/ cally proscribing the threat or  use of  nuclear  weapons per se, it will now deal with the 
question whether recourse to  nuclear  weapons must be considered as illegal in the light of the 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed con+ ict and the 
law of  neutrality” and at §259: “[…] it cannot be concluded […] that the established principles 
and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed con+ ict (do) not apply to  nuclear 
 weapons”.
54 Ibid., §263: “[…] the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a de/ nite conclusion as to 
the legality or illegality of the  use of  nuclear  weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance 
of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake”. In the dispositif of the Advisory 
Opinion (at 266) this has been slightly reworded. For a good analysis, see Y. Dinstein, supra 
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of  weapons. As is explained in the following section, however, the mere fact that 
a particular weapon has not been speci/ cally and explicitly outlawed, does not 
mean that its use is necessarily always lawful in armed con+ ict.
1.3.  WEAPONS THE USE OF WHICH MAY BE UNLAWFUL
As previously stated, it must be clearly understood that the mere fact that no 
explicit prohibition has been adopted in regard of a particular weapon does not 
necessarily or automatically mean that its use would always be lawful. ) e rules 
under the law of armed con+ ict relating to  attacks have direct implications for 
the legality of particular types of  weapons. Most prominently in this regard is 
a rule which directly + ows (yet which is separate and to be distinguished) from, 
and further operationalises, the quintessential  principle of  distinction, i.e. the 
rule prohibiting so-called  indiscriminate  attacks.55
) e notion of “ indiscriminate  attacks” – explicitly prohibited as per this 
provision – is de/ ned in Article 51(4) AP I, which is worth quoting in full:
 Indiscriminate  attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a speci/ c military 
objective; (b) those which employ a method or  means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a speci/ c military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or  means 
of combat the e{ ects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike  military objectives and 
 civilians or  civilian objects without  distinction.
While (a) is not directly relevant from the angle of the law of weaponry, the 
same cannot be said for (b) and (c). In essence, these provisions boil down to the 
requirement that a belligerent party needs to be able to control the e{ ects of the 
 weapons it uses in the course of an armed con+ ict, i.e. every weapon needs to 
be capable of complying with the  principle of  distinction between  civilians and 
 civilian objects, on the one hand, versus  combatants and  military objectives, on 
the other hand.
An attack using a weapon is  indiscriminate when the attacker, while not 
seeking to directly target  civilians (in which case the attack violates the  principle 
of  distinction and may even qualify as a war crime on that basis), does not care 
whether his attack hits  civilians.56 ) e choice of a particular weapon, i.e. one 
unable to be of a discriminate nature, may be indicative in this regard. At its 
most basic level, this means that any weapon has to be able to be controlled by 
the belligerent party employing it: the belligerent party has to be able to clearly 
55 Further: A. Cassese, “) e prohibition of  indiscriminate means of warfare”, in R.J. 
Akkerman (ed.), Declarations on principles. A quest for universal peace. Liber amicorum 
discipluromque Prof. Dr. Bert V.A. Röling, Leiden, Springer, 1977, 171–194.







Chapter 9. Means and Methods of Warfare
Intersentia 317
direct the weapon to a military objective, and has to be able to distinguish 
between  military objectives and  civilian objects. Without making any statements 
as to the lawfulness of intercontinental ballistic  missiles in general, it cannot 
be excluded that some of these  missiles do not allow for the attack to clearly 
direct where the missile will hit the ground. Provided all other conditions of the 
 de/ nition as to what constitutes an “ indiscriminate attack” have been ful/ lled, 
the use of such  missiles may, in these circumstances, be prohibited under AP I. 
De/ nitely prohibited will be unguided  missiles which cannot be directed at all, 
i.e. in respect of which the attacker has no clue, nor control over the factor, as to 
where it will strike.
It is important in this regard to keep in mind the di{ erence between  weapons 
that will always, in and of themselves, be in violation of the  principle of  distinction 
(e.g.,  biological  weapons, which are in any case prohibited under the  Biological 
 Weapons Convention and  customary international law), and  weapons that can be 
used discriminately, but the use of which will be considered  indiscriminate in a 
particular context. Article 51(5) AP I itself provides two non-exhaustive examples 
of what are to be considered  indiscriminate  attacks, one of which codi/ es the 
 principle of  proportionality, i.e. the prohibition of conducting an attack “which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to  civilians, damage 
to  civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct  military advantage anticipated” (Article 51(5)(b) AP I). 
Of course, the latter rule has no direct bearing on the legality of  weapons and the 
 principle of  proportionality drastically transcends the topic of  weapons. Yet, it must 
be kept in mind that some  weapons are known to have dramatic reverberating 
e{ ects beyond their direct kinetic impact. In such case, they may be unlawful as 
per a violation of the  principle of  proportionality, which is dealt with below.
2. METHODS OF WARFARE
) ough o< en mentioned in the same sentence, “methods of warfare” are 
di{ erent from “means of warfare”. As mentioned above, while neither term is 
authoritatively de/ ned at the level of treaty law (see supra), they mean di{ erent 
things. “Means” of warfare refers to  weapons, as well as  weapons launch and 
delivery systems. “Methods” of warfare, by contrast, refers to tactics, such as 
 starvation, or the way in which  weapons are used.
2.1. THE BASIC RULES OF  ATTACKS
) e purpose of this part is to set out the basic rules pertaining to the (un)
lawfulness of  attacks. Clearly, this is a vast subject the importance of which 
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let alone controversies pertaining to the margins of their contours. Yet, the 
interesting feature of the law of armed con+ ict on this subject resides exactly 
in the fact that these basic rules are relatively easy to understand for everyone, 
which obviously is a factor of huge importance in real-life terms: the viability 
of the law of armed con+ icts depends upon the existence of clear norms that are 
accessible, understandable and also plausible for all  combatants, including those 
at the lower levels of the military hierarchy.
Reduced to its essence, the law of armed con+ ict pertaining to the conduct 
of hostilities hinges upon the  principle of  distinction “between the civilian 
population and  combatants and between  civilian objects and  military objectives” 
(Article  48 AP I), proscribing that “operations” may only be directed against 
 military objectives (see supra Chapter 7 of this volume).
In order to properly understand the rules on targeting, one needs to clearly 
di{ erentiate (as does the law) between “military operations” and the more 
limited category of “ attacks”. While the / rst notion is not de/ ned in treaty 
law, the concept of “attack” is described in Article  49 AP I as meaning “acts 
of violence against the adversary, whether in  o{ ence or in defence”. ) us, the 
crucial threshold question, as to whether a particular military operation quali/ es 
as an “attack”, relates to whether it involves “acts of violence”. Quite a number of 
military operations, as resorted to by the  armed forces in the course of an armed 
con+ ict, do not reach this threshold. Espionage or other forms of  intelligence 
gathering which do not involve any act of violence are primary examples. Hence, 
they are not covered by those rules of AP I whose application hinges upon the 
existence of an “attack”. Similarly, since  propaganda does not involve any “act 
of violence”, it does not qualify as an “attack”. ) e notion of “attack” as used 
in the law of armed con+ ict needs to be kept sharply separate from the notion 
of “ armed attack”, belonging to  jus ad bellum and found in Article  51  UN 
Charter.57
Undoubtedly qualifying as one of the law of armed con+ ict’s most important 
rules, Article 52(1) AP I states that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be the object of 
 attacks or of  reprisals”; Article 52(2) AP I in turn provides that “[a]ttacks shall 
be limited strictly to  military objectives”. ) e latter provision also contains a 
 de/ nition of what constitutes a “military objective”.
Based upon this conceptual framework, the law regulating  attacks is 
straightforward.58 First and foremost, one needs to assess whether or not the 
57  Charter of the United Nations, 26  June 1945 (Compendium 1). On the  jus ad bellum 
understanding of “ armed attack”, see, for instance: O. Corten, Le droit contre la guerre, 
2nd ed., Paris, Pedone, 2014, 657 et seq.; A. Randelzhofer and G. Nolte, “Article 51” in B. 
Simma et al. (eds.), # e  Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary Vol. II, 3rd ed., Oxford, 
OUP, 2012, 1397–1444, §§16 et seq.; T. Ruys, ‘ Armed attack’ and Article 51 of the  UN Charter, 
Cambridge, CUP, 2010, 585.
58 For a very detailed analysis, upon which this paragraph is directly based, see M.N. Schmitt, 
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target is a lawful one, i.e. whether it quali/ es as a military objective. Also lawful 
to be directly attacked are  combatants and  civilians taking a direct part in 
hostilities, albeit that in the case of the latter this holds true only “for such time 
as they take a direct part in hostilities” (Article 51(3) of AP I). ) e contours of the 
latter subject have led to intense debates within the community of IHL Experts59 
but are not dealt with here. Su  ce it to mention for the present purposes that, 
in addition to  military objectives,  combatants and  civilians taking a direct part 
in hostilities, for the time of their taking such part, can also be subjected to an 
attack directed against them. Second, one must assess whether the  means and 
methods of warfare resorted to in order to carry out the attack are lawful under 
the law of armed con+ ict. ) irdly, even if all of the previous is the case, one must 
still assess whether or not the attack violates the  principle of  proportionality, 
as de/ ned in Article 51(5)(b) AP I.60 Finally, a range of “precautions in  attacks” 
requirements need to be assessed, all of which are designed so as to spare 
 civilians to the extent possible. ) ese so-called  precautions in attack61 are 
dealt with in Article 57 AP I and contain a variety of requirements compelling 
an attacker to ensure, through veri/ cation, choice of means and methods of 
attack, etc., that incidental loss of civilian life or damage to  civilian objects is 
“avoid[ed], and in any event […] minimiz[ed]” (see the yardstick as set out in 
Article 57(2) AP I). ) e phraseology pertaining to the interplay between “avoid” 
and “minimise” is revealing for the law’s logic on this topic, in that the law 
acknowledges that (provided the  principle of  proportionality is not violated) 
it may not always be possible to fully spare the civilian population. In that 
eventuality, and with continued reference to the applicability of the  principle of 
 proportionality, the attacker has an obligation that “in any event” such loss of 
civilian lives and damage to  civilian objects is minimised.
Of particular relevance is the requirement contained in Article  57(2)(c) 
AP I, which provides that “ e{ ective advance  warning shall be given of  attacks 
which may a{ ect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit”. 
) is obligation is at times implemented by aerial droppings of lea+ ets over areas 
boundaries of international humanitarian law, London, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2006, 277–307, with the summary provided at 277–278. Further: W.H. 
Boothby, # e Law of Targeting, Oxford, OUP, 2012, 603; I.S. Henderson, # e contemporary 
law of targeting, Leiden, Nijho{ , 2009, 266.
59 In 2009, the ICRC set out its views on the subject in its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion 
of  Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets// les/other/icrc-002–0990.pdf [accessed on 16 July 2015]. For 
a discussion in the academic literature, see e.g., the articles by N. Melzer, M.N. Schmitt, W. 
Hays Parks, W.H. Boothby and K. Watkin in 42–3 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 2010.
60 Further: E. Cannizzaro, “ Proportionality in the law of armed con+ ict”, in A. Clapham and 
P. Gaeta (eds.), # e Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Con! ict, Oxford, OUP, 
2014, 332–352.
61 Further: J.-F. Quéguiner, “Precautions under the law governing the conduct of hostilities”, 
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 warning inhabitants of an impending attack62 (as  Israel did, for instance, in the 
Gaza Strip in the course of Operation Protective Edge in 2014).63 ) e very same 
trade-o{  is at play here: the requirement to issue an “ e{ ective advance  warning”, 
indeed, is not an absolute one. In particular, if the whole point of a particular 
attack is to be a so-called surprise attack, then “circumstances do not permit” 
and no  warning needs to be issued to the civilian population. ) is, of course, 
by no means detracts from the continued applicability of all other requirements 
preconditioning the lawfulness of a particular attack.
2.2.  PERFIDY
Prominent among the restrictions on methods of warfare is the prohibition on 
 per/ dy. ) is rule can be traced back to discussions regarding the legality of the 
assassination of  enemy kings during the heydays of the bellum justum doctrine. 
Initially, scholars such as St.  ) omas Aquinas and Sir  ) omas More expressed 
support for the idea that the killing of an “evil sovereign” was justi/ ed in order 
to spare the innocent and punish those responsible for wars.64 However, from 
the 16th century onwards, through the writings of  Ayala,  Gentili, Grotius,  Vattel 
and  Kant, a new norm emerged distinguishing between permissible trickery 
and impermissible “frauds and snares”, including putting a price on an  enemy’s 
head.65 ) e latter practices were rejected on the grounds that they rendered those 
pursuing a just cause indistinguishable from the tyrants they fought. Over time, 
a consensus emerged rejecting the use of treacherous means in combat. ) is 
approach was subsequently copied in the various codi/ cations of the laws of war.
Article  23(b) Hague Regulations currently provides that it is “forbidden 
to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army”.66 ) is prohibition was further rea  rmed and developed by AP I, which 
replaced the term “treachery” by the broader concept of “ per/ dy”. Article 37(1) 
AP I reads as follows: “It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by 
62 Further: P. Sharvit Baruch and N. Neuman, “ Warning  civilians prior to attack under 
international law: theory and practice”, 87 Naval War College – International Law Studies 
2011, 359–412.
63 But see:  Amnesty International, Document –  Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: 
 Israel/Gaza Con+ ict, July 2014, Questions & Answers, 25 July 2014, available at www. amnesty.
org/en/library/asset/MDE15/017/2014/en/5b79b682–8d41–4751–9cbc-a0465f6433c3/
mde150172014en.html [accessed on 16 July 2015] (claiming that  Israel did not ful/ l its duty to 
give  e{ ective advance  warning).
64 St.  Thomas Aquinas, On Politics and Ethics (13th century) (translated by P.E. Sigmund), 
New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1987, 49; Sir  Thomas More, Utopia (1516) (translated 
by P. Turner), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1965, 111–112.
65 See T.C. Wingfield, “Chivalry in the  use of force”, 32 U. Toledo L. Rev. 2001, 111–136, 131; 
T.C. Wingfield, “Taking aim at regime elites: assassination, tyrannicide, and the Clancy 
doctrine”, 22 Maryland J. Int’ l L. & Trade 1999, 299.
66 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Hague 
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resort to  per/ dy”. In sum, the law of armed con+ ict permits the singling out 
of an individual soldier as a target provided the attack is carried out without 
treachery or  per/ dy. ) e same goes for the targeting of an  enemy head of State, if 
he or she would qualify as a combatant, albeit that  attacks against foreign leaders 
have generally been limited as a matter of comity.67
In modern-day literature, the terms “ per/ dy” and “treachery” are commonly 
used as synonyms; preference is given however to the term “ per/ dy”. ) e real 
problem is to distinguish unlawful acts of  per/ dy from  ruses of war, which are 
not unlawful, as set out in Article 24 Hague Regulations and Article 37(2) AP I. 
) e latter Article describes  ruses of war as acts intended to mislead an adversary 
or to induce him to act recklessly, which do not infringe rules of the law of armed 
con+ ict, and which are not per/ dious. Examples are the use of  camou+ age, 
decoys, mock operations and misinformation.  Per/ dy, on the other hand, is 
de/ ned by Article  37(1) AP I as “acts inviting the con/ dence of an adversary 
to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection 
under the rules of international law applicable in armed con+ ict, with the intent 
to betray that con/ dence”. ) ree elements are at the core of this concept. Firstly, 
there has to be an intentional betrayal of con/ dence. Secondly, this con/ dence 
must relate to protection under the rules of the law of armed con+ ict. Finally, 
 per/ dy is prohibited only insofar as it intentionally kills, injures or captures68 
the  enemy. Essentially, the prohibition of  per/ dy pertains to the prohibition of 
pretending to bene/ t of a particular protective regime under the law of armed 
con+ ict, while abusing the adversary’s belief that he is obliged to accord such 
protection, in order to kill, injury or, under the rules of AP I, capture that 
adversary. In short, one invites to obtain, and subsequently  breaches, the  enemy’s 
con/ dence, thus violating principles of good faith.69
Article 37(2) contains a non-exhaustive list of examples of  per/ dy: 1) feigning 
a desire to negotiate under a truce or  surrender + ag; 2) feigning incapacitation by 
wounds or sickness; 3) feigning non-combatant status; and 4)  feigning protected 
status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the UN or States not party to 
the con+ ict.70
67 ) e United States Army Operational Law Handbook, for example, remarks that the  principle 
of  military necessity forbids the killing of a head of state in wartime if his death is not 
indispensable for securing the submission of the  enemy: J. Rawcliffe and J. Smith (eds.), US 
Army Judge-Advocate General’s Operational Law Handbook, 2006, available at www.fas.org/
irp/doddir/army/law0806.pdf [accessed on 16 July 2015].
68 For the sake of exhaustivity, mention must be made of the fact that, qua  customary 
international law, a number of States that are non-signatory to AP I, refuse to recognise that 
there would also be a customary prohibition to “capture” an  enemy by resort to per/ dious 
methods of warfare. See also the discussion contained in J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-
Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 225.
69 Ibid., 223.
70 E.g., when Bosnian Muslims + ed a< er the fall of  Srebrenica in July 1995, Bosnian Serbs 
wearing stolen UN uniforms and driving stolen UN vehicles managed to lure dozens of them 
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It will o< en be hard to determine whether speci/ c conduct amounts to 
 per/ dy or not.71 Advancing under the  enemy + ag or while wearing  enemy 
uniforms, for example, constitutes a lawful ruse. In the context of an actual 
attack, however, this conduct may become unlawful, provided the various 
components of the  de/ nition of “ per/ dy” have been met.
An example of a lawful attack concerns the killing of the Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto, whose plane was ambushed and shot down in 1943, a< er the US 
military had successfully broken the Japanese communication codes and found 
out about the admiral’s travel plans.72 ) e killing of SS General Heydrich in 1942 
on the other hand seems unlawful.73 Heydrich died when a bomb was thrown 
into his car by two ununiformed members of the Free Czechoslovak army. ) is 
action did not constitute lawful  camou+ age, but rather per/ dious feigning of 
civilian status.
As to the applicability of the prohibition on  per/ dy, it must / nally be 
stressed that this rule forms part of  customary international law and therefore 
binds States whether or not they have adhered to the treaties. ) is is evidently 
true with regard to international armed con+ icts, as the rule is enshrined in the 
Hague Regulations and AP I, as well as a large number of military manuals.74 
With the possible exception of the “capture” prong of the treaty-based rule, 
evidence moreover suggests that the rule has attained customary status 
with regard to non-international armed con+ icts as well.75 ) us, the ICTY 
recognised in the  Tadić case that “State practice shows that general principles 
of  customary international law have evolved with regard to internal armed 
con+ ict also in areas relating to methods of warfare. […] [M]ention can be made 
71 See on this (stressing the need for a causative link between the per/ dious act and the resulting 
death, injury or capture of an  enemy): M. Madden, “Of wolves and sheep: a purposive 
analysis of  per/ dy prohibitions in international humanitarian law”, 17 J. Con! . & Sec. L. 
2012, 439–463.
72 See, e.g., P. Zengel, “Assassination and the law of armed con+ ict”, 43 Mercer L. Rev. 1992, 
627.
73 Y. Dinstein, supra note 17, 95.
74 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, Vol. 2: Practice, 1368 et seq.
75 See: R.B. Jackson, “ Per/ dy in non-international armed con+ icts”, 88 Naval War College 
– International Law Studies 2012, 237–259 (246–247: “ Per/ dy in the form of misuse of a 
protected emblem to capture an  enemy in  non-international armed con+ ict has not become 
 customary international law”). In a similar vein: M.N. Schmitt, C.H.B. Garraway and Y. 
Dinstein, # e Manual on the Law of  Non-international armed con! ict 2006, 43–44 available 
at www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/) e%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.
pdf [accessed on 16 July 2015]. But see the conclusion by Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck that 
“killing, injuring or capturing by resort to  per/ dy is illegal under  customary international 
law but that only acts that result in serious bodily injury, namely killing or injuring, would 
constitute a war crime”: J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 225 
(emphasis added). Finding that there is authority in support of both competing positions: 
S. Sivakumaran, # e law of  non-international armed con! ict, Oxford, OUP, 2012, 419. See 
also the account of the  Colombia mission to rescue a group of  hostages from FARC  captivity 
in: J.C. Dehn, “Permissible  per/ dy? Analysing the Colombian hostage rescue, the capture of 
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of the prohibition of  per/ dy”.76 In similar vein, provided the other conditions 
for individual criminal responsibility are met, Article  8(2)(e)(ix) ICC Statute 
identi/ es the treacherous killing or wounding of a combatant as a violation of 
the laws and customs applicable in con+ icts not of an international character.
2.3.  STARVATION,  SIEGE WARFARE AND RELIEF 
OPERATIONS
 Customary international law forbids the  starvation of  civilians as a method 
of warfare, both with regard to international and internal armed con+ icts77 
(see also Chapter 7 of this volume). As a matter of treaty-law78, Article  54(1) 
AP I codi/ es the rule that “[s]tarvation of  civilians as a method of warfare is 
prohibited”. From the outset, it must be clearly understood that this relates only 
to  starvation “of  civilians”, meaning that  starvation of  combatants is perfectly 
lawful. Furthermore, the scope of this provision is limited in that it only relates 
to  starvation as a “method of warfare”.
Although the prohibition of  starvation of  civilians “as a method of warfare” 
may seem evident nowadays, the outlawry of  starvation is, historically speaking, 
a rather novel development. Indeed, for centuries,  starvation of  civilians was 
o< entimes regarded as a common feature of warfare, intended to bring about 
the  surrender of the adversary by weakening and demoralising him, o< en in 
combination with  siege warfare, i.e. the encircling of a defended city or fortress, 
while cutting of that city or fortress’s supply channels. Not only was  starvation 
of  civilians regarded as an inevitable corollary of war, it used, moreover, to be 
considered lawful to prevent  civilians from escaping a besieged town in order to 
increase the pressure on the defending force and hasten their  surrender. ) us, 
when Field Marshal von Leeb ordered his artillery to / re on Russian  civilians 
attempting to + ee Leningrad through the German lines, this conduct was 
subsequently held to be lawful in the High Command case (1948). ) e tribunal in 
that case added: “we might wish the law were otherwise, but we must administer 
it as we / nd it”.79 Since that statement, the law on the subject has drastically 
evolved.
76 ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, Decision of the Defence 
Motion on Interlocutory Appeal on  Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, §125.
77 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 186–202. Consider also: 
 Ethiopia- Eritrea Claims Commission, Partial Award, Western Front,  Aerial  Bombardment 
and related claims,  Eritrea’s Claims, 45 I.L.M. 2005, 396, §105.
78 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.) supra note 4, 186–189, argue that “State 
practice establishes this rule as a norm of  customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed con+ icts”.
79 General Military Government Court of the US Zone of  Germany, High Command Case 
( United States of America v. von Leeb et. al.), 27–28 October 1948, 11 Trials of War Criminals 
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) e problem of civilian distress due to  starvation was / rst addressed in 
GC IV,80 which provided steps that may lead to some form of protection for 
the  civilians in this situation. ) e logic of GC IV proceeds along three steps. 
Firstly, parties to a con+ ict are urged (Article  17 GC IV uses the words “shall 
endeavour”) to conclude agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled 
areas of  wounded,  sick and aged persons,  children and maternity cases, and 
for the passage of  medical personnel and equipment to such areas. Secondly, 
subject to certain preconditions, parties are obliged to allow the free passage of 
all consignments of medical and  hospital stores for exclusively civilian use, as 
well as “essential foodstu{ s and clothing intended for  children,  pregnant  women 
and maternity cases” (Article 23 GC IV), i.e. as far as these “essential foodstu{  
and clothing” are concerned, this does not relate to the civilian population at 
large. Finally, for the case of  occupation, Occupying Powers are – under certain 
preconditions as well – under the duty to ensure the food and medical supplies 
of the population in the occupied territory to the fullest extent of the means 
available to it (Article 55 GC IV).
Needless to say these are very narrow provisions. In 1949, States were very 
anxious to retain control. Article  17 GC IV does not provide for compulsory 
 evacuation, but merely recommends that an agreement be concluded thereto. 
Secondly, Articles  17 and 23 GC IV only address certain groups which are 
deemed particularly vulnerable and are, most prominently, limited to a narrow 
scope of humanitarian goods only. Finally, Article 55 GC IV is only applicable in 
situations of  belligerent  occupation.
AP I has to some extent expanded the scope of protection to  civilians on 
this topic. ) us, Article 54 AP I forbids parties to a con+ ict to attack, destroy, 
remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, for the speci( c purpose of denying them for their sustenance value 
to the civilian population or to the adverse party, regardless of the underlying 
motive (Article  54(2) AP I). “Indispensable” objects can include any of the 
following: foodstu{ s, crops, livestock, drinking water and irrigation works. 
As the examples listed in Article  54 AP I are non-exhaustive, other non-food 
objects, such as medicines or blankets, may arguably also be covered. Only two 
exceptions are allowed. Firstly, the prohibition does not apply when the objects 
are used solely as sustenance for the members of adverse party’s  armed forces, 
or in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in the latter case, 
the civilian population be le<  with adequate food and water.81 Secondly, a party 
may lawfully derogate from the prohibition enshrined in Article  54(2) AP I 
80 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 
12 August 1949 (hereina< er GC IV) (Compendium 97).
81 Dinstein strongly critiques Art. 54 AP I on the ground that it de facto implies a broad, and 
unrealistic, injunction against sieges involving  civilians. According to the author: “It stands 
to reason that the practice of States will not con/ rm the sweeping abolition of  siege warfare 
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while retreating or evacuating from its own territory prior to its  occupation by 
an invading army. In such situations, “imperative  military necessity” may justify 
resort to a “scorched earth” policy, a famous historical example thereof being 
the Russian policy to systematically burn all crops during Napoleon’s calamitous 
Moscow campaign. Another example would be the + ooding of low-lying areas in 
order to slow down the adversary’s advances.
It should be reiterated that Article  54 AP I does not a{ ect the legality of 
 starvation of  combatants. Neither is it intended to alter existing rules on naval 
or aerial blockades. Furthermore, Article  54 (“as a method of warfare”) does 
not prohibit military operations which only incidentally deprive  civilians of 
foodstu{ s, while serving particular military interests. For this reason, it is 
allowed to destroy crops in order to deny cover to  enemy forces.82 In a similar 
vein,  combatants may lawfully mine a / eld in order to prevent  enemy troops 
from passing through (subject, of course, to the  principle of  distinction, 
and applicable treaty rules (cf. the second Protocol to the Convention on 
 Conventional  Weapons or the Ottawa Convention on  anti-personnel  mines)). If, 
however, the goal would be to deprive  civilians of their harvest, the conduct may 
become unlawful as per the conditions of Article 54 AP I.
Both the general prohibition on  starvation of  civilians as a method of warfare 
and the prohibition to destroy, attack or remove objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population are also included in AP II dealing with non-
international armed con+ icts (Article  14 AP II), albeit without copying the 
aforementioned exceptions. ) e inclusion of Article  14 AP II was due to the 
 intervention during the 1977 Conference of the representative of the Holy See, 
who strongly objected to the proposed deletion of the Article from the dra<  
text.83
In order to gain a better insight into the legal framework governing  starvation 
and  siege warfare, the rules of Article 54 AP I and Article 14 AP II must be read 
in conjunction with the provisions on humanitarian relief operations. Various 
situations must be clearly distinguished in order to understand the multifaceted 
nature of the currently applicable legal framework. A comprehensive assessment 
of these provisions is outside the scope of this contribution.
Articulated for the situation of  occupation, yet conceptually applicable 
to all situations of armed con+ ict, mention must be made of Article  69 AP I. 
) is provision has expanded the list of goods that can explicitly be regarded 
as “essential to the survival of the civilian population”. ) is list now also 
covers “clothing, bedding, means of  shelter” along with the catch-all of “other 
supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied 
territory” (emphasis added). ) erefore, the bottom line is that  humanitarian 
assistance includes those supplies that are “essential to the survival of the civilian 
82 L. Green, # e Contemporary Law of Armed Con! ict, 2nd ed., Manchester, MUP, 2000, 143.
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population” (emphasis added), which is a narrow phrase that does not easily 
extend to welfare-enhancing or other developmental activities. Humanitarian 
relief, as circumscribed by the law of armed con+ ict, primarily seeks to ensure 
the survival and dignity of the victims of an armed con+ ict.84
) e thrust of the legal framework pertaining to humanitarian relief in 
situations of  occupation is to be found in Article  59 GC IV, which states that, 
“if the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately 
supplied, the  Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said 
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal” (emphasis 
added). ) is means that, if the condition at the beginning of the sentence is 
ful/ lled in practice (i.e. the civilian population is inadequately supplied), the 
 Occupying Power arguably has an actual legal obligation, under the law of 
armed con+ ict, to accept o{ ers of relief made with regard to operations inside 
the occupied territory.
) e legal regulation of relief schemes in occupied territory stands, in 
this regard, in contrast with the treaty-based legal framework regarding 
humanitarian relief schemes in non-occupied territory while in situation of 
armed con+ ict. “Consent” of the belligerent party to the  relief action in question, 
is indeed the name of the game. As far as international armed con+ icts are 
concerned, this requirement of consent can be found in Article 70 AP I (“subject 
to the agreement of the Parties concerned”). As far as non-international 
armed con+ icts reaching the threshold of AP II are concerned, this can be 
found in Article  18 AP II (“subject to the consent of the High Contracting 
Party concerned”). As far as  non-international armed con+ ict reaching only 
the threshold of common Article  3 to the GCs are concerned, the law does 
not go any further than to state that “[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such 
as the  International Committee of the  Red Cross, may o{ er its services to the 
Parties to the con+ ict”, i.e. no actual obligation can be deduced therefrom for 
the belligerent parties. ) ere is, in short, no “right of access” for anyone in these 
situations. Legally speaking, everything depends exclusively and entirely upon 
the consent of the belligerent party in question. Initially, the law was understood 
to mean that the party to the armed con+ ict, to which the o{ er of services 
had been made, retained its full discretion with regard to deciding whether 
or not to accept such an o{ er. On this particular point, international law has 
undergone drastic modi/ cations in that it is now accepted as a mainstream legal 
doctrine that, when an o{ er of services is made by an impartial humanitarian 
organisation, “consent” cannot be refused on arbitrary grounds.85 ) is position 
84 Consider in this context ) e Public Commission to examine the maritime incident of 31 May 
2010 (the Turkel Commission), Report, Part One, January 2011, §§78 et seq. (particularly §80), 
available at www.turkel-committee.gov.il// les/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf [accessed on 
17 July 2015].
85 In this sense, e.g., C.A. Allen, “Civilian  starvation and relief during armed con+ ict: the 
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is linked to the fact that, under general international law, a party to an armed 
con+ ict carries the primary responsibility to meet the humanitarian needs of 
the population under its control. ) us, where such party is unable or unwilling 
itself to meet these needs, it has to accept o{ ers made in this regard by impartial 
humanitarian organisations.
As / nal step in the analysis, ) e fact that consent has been granted, does 
not preclude a belligerent party to exercise control over relief operations in 
order to determine whether they are of an exclusively humanitarian and 
impartial nature, as set out in great detail in Article 70 AP I. Relief personnel are 
moreover required to respect domestic law and to take account of the security 
requirements in force (Article 71 AP I). Obviously, these are provisions leaving a 
great deal of discretion in the hands of the belligerent party.
) e reluctance of belligerent parties to allow access to relief operations 
occasionally attracts the attention of the international community. In relation to 
the Syrian  civil war, for instance, the UN  Security Council adopted a resolution 
in early 2014 demanding “that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, 
promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access”.86 Even a< er 
the adoption of the resolution, however, the United Nations rejected calls for it 
to deliver humanitarian aid across borders into  Syria without the approval of the 
government in Damascus, instead asserting that such operations would only be 
possible under a stronger Chapter 7 resolution.87
Despite the fact that the various rules on  starvation and humanitarian relief 
operations are considered to be part of  customary international law, both with 
regard to international and non-international armed con+ icts,88 deliberate 
 starvation and impediment of humanitarian  relief action was widely practiced 
in the con+ icts in  Ethiopia,  Sudan, Laos,  Nigeria, the former  Yugoslavia, etc.89 
It regrettably remains a recurrent feature in more recent con+ icts, such as the 
Syrian  civil war.90 Moreover, in reality,  armed forces o< en condition the passage 
of humanitarian convoys on the yielding of a substantial part of the supplies to 
the  armed forces. Given the preponderance of these violations in the context of 
non-international armed con+ icts, it is most regrettable that the ICC Statute does 
and Lexicon on Humanitarian Access”, 2014, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
/ les/2014/icrc-q-and-a-lexison-on-humanitarian-access-06–2014.pdf [accessed on 17  July 
2015].
86 UNSC Resolution 2139 of 22 February 2014, UN Doc. S/RES/2139.
87 See: T. Ruys and N. Verlinden, supra note 37, 350.
88 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 186–202.
89 E.g., K. Oteng Kufuor, “ Starvation as a means of warfare in the Liberian con+ ict”, 41 Neth. 
Int’l L. Rev. 1994, 313–331; J.S. Bashi, “Prosecuting  starvation in the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of  Cambodia”, 29 Wisconsin Int’l L.J. 2011, 34–69; International Crisis 
Group, “Ending  starvation as a weapon of war in  Sudan”, Africa Report No. 54, 14 November 
2002, available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ sudan/054-ending-
 starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-in- sudan.aspx [accessed on 23 July 2015].
90 See e.g., Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
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not list intentional  starvation and the wilful impediment of relief supplies among 
the violations of the laws and customs applicable in non-international armed 
con+ icts. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) ICC Statute does however consider, provided the 
other conditions for individual criminal  liability have been met, these acts to 
constitute  war crimes when committed in the context of an international armed 
con+ ict.
2.4. PROTECTION OF THE  NATURAL  ENVIRONMENT91
Despite large-scale environmental destruction during the  Second World War, 
from burning oil / elds in  Romania to the mushroom clouds over  Japan, States 
initially showed little interest for the cause of the  environment in times of armed 
con+ ict.92 ) is was illustrated by the complete absence of the term in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. ) e only protection awarded by law of armed con+ ict 
was of an indirect nature and had to be derived from the general principles 
concerning  military necessity and  proportionality.93 As a result, environmental 
damage was accepted insofar as it served a military purpose and did not cause 
damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct  military 
advantage anticipated from the attack. Clearly, under the logic of the  principle 
of  distinction, the  natural  environment has to be regarded as civilian in nature, 
and thus cannot be directly attacked. ) e  natural  environment was, however, 
only protected from direct attack, with indirect  attacks remaining permissible to 
the extent not prohibited under the  principle of  proportionality.
) e lack of speci/ c protection accorded by the law of armed con+ ict to 
the  natural  environment was prominently brought to the attention of the 
international community as a result of the  Vietnam War. Indeed, during 
the latter con+ ict, the American military used the destruction of forests and 
dense vegetation as a method of warfare, so as to deny cover to the Viet Cong 
guerrillas.94 Enormous areas of land were stripped of all vegetation by spraying 
herbicides (so-called Agent Orange), or by means of heavy tractors. Large-
91 Further: R.G. Rayfuse (ed.), War and the  environment: new approaches to protecting 
the  environment in relation to armed con! ict, Leiden, Nijho{ , 2014, 234; United Nations 
 Environment Programme, Protecting the  environment during armed con! ict: an inventory 
and analysis of international law, Nairobi, UNEP, 2009, 83; R.J. Grunawalt, J.E. King 
and R.S. McClain (eds.), Protection of the  environment during armed con+ ict, 69 Naval 
War College – Int’l L. Studies 1996, 720; Y. Dinstein, “Protection of the  environment in 
international armed con+ ict”, 5 Max Planck Yb. UN L. 2001, 523–549.
92 M.N. Schmitt, “Green War: An assessment of the environmental law of international armed 
con+ ict”, 22 Yale J. Int’ l L. 1997, 9.
93 ) e applicability of these principles was con/ rmed, inter alia, by the General Assembly, the 
ICRC and the ICJ: see, e.g., UNGA Resolution 47/37 of 25 November 1992 (protection of the 
 environment in times of armed con+ ict), adopted without a vote; ICJ, Legality of the # reat or 
 Use of  Nuclear  Weapons, supra note 4, §62.
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scale deforestation was combined with other practices, such as the (attempted) 
seeding of clouds in order to lengthen the rainy season. ) e consequences to the 
 natural  environment were considerable.
As a result, the environmental impact of the  Vietnam War soon spurred calls 
for new law. A two-track approach was followed. First of all,  negotiations on 
limiting environmental warfare led to the conclusion in 1977 of the Convention 
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modi/ cation Techniques95, which deals speci/ cally with techniques of warfare 
that involve the deliberate manipulation of natural processes. Article I forbids 
States that are party to the Convention to engage in military, or any other hostile 
use of environmental modi/ cation techniques having “widespread, long-lasting 
or severe” e{ ects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State 
Party. States must moreover refrain from assisting, encouraging or inducing 
other States to engage in such activities.
) e phenomena envisaged by the prohibition may include inter alia, as a 
military technique, the triggering of earthquakes, tsunamis, changes in weather 
patterns, changes in climate patterns, changes in ocean currents, changes in the 
state of the ozone layer, upsets in the ecological balance of a region, and changes 
in the state of the ionosphere. Although ENMOD was inspired by the possible 
development of science-/ ction-type weapon systems (such as “cloud seeding”), 
it could possibly – provided the general conditions of “widespread, long-lasting 
or severe” have been met – also comprise more “traditional”  means and methods 
of warfare, such as the widespread use of herbicides or / re to destroy forests. At 
the same time, the Convention is sometimes criticised for exclusively prohibiting 
the use of, and not the testing or development of, the said techniques. Another 
stumbling block is the weak investigation and  enforcement system provided by 
ENMOD.
Obviously, the key to understanding the proper scope of application of this 
Convention is to / gure out what exactly is meant by the words “widespread, 
long-lasting or severe”. ) e negotiating States adopted an Understanding, 
which provided some further guidance as to how each of these concepts is to 
be understood.96 Overall, it may be observed that each of these concepts is to 
be understood very restrictively.97 On the other hand, it must be emphasised 
that the three criteria used in the  ENMOD convention are disjunctive and not 
95 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modi/ cation Techniques of 18 May 1977 (Compendium 388).
96 Reproduced in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford, OUP, 
2000, 407: “It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purpose of this Convention, 
the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’ shall be interpreted as follows: (a) 
‘widespread’: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres; (b) 
‘long-lasting’: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; (c) ‘severe’: involving 
serious or signi/ cant disruption or harm to harm life, natural and economic resources or 
other assets”.
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cumulative in nature. In this, ENMOD drastically di{ ers from AP I, which the 
following paragraphs will now address.
A second remedy adopted and inspired by the experience of the  Vietnam War 
concerns the inclusion of two provisions in AP I, Articles 35(3) and 55, which for 
the / rst time provide for some limited form of direct environmental protection 
in situations of international armed con+ ict (see also supra Chapter 7 of this 
volume). Article  35(3) AP I prohibits the use of means or methods of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and 
 severe  damage to the  natural  environment. Article 55 AP I further elaborates the 
prohibition, while stressing that damage to the  environment which prejudices 
the health or survival of the population is fully covered. ) us, the provisions 
respond equally to the anthropocentric value camp, which advocates the 
protection of nature for the sake of mankind, and the intrinsic value camp, 
which champions the protection of nature as a goal in itself.98
Although overlap may occur between the  ENMOD Convention and 
Articles 35(3) and 55 AP I, it is clear that the latter provisions cover a far broader 
range of activities. Indeed, whereas ENMOD only considers the manipulation of 
the  environment as a method of warfare, the Protocol protects the  environment 
(and the population) against damage in+ icted by all means or methods of 
warfare. Furthermore, unlike ENMOD, the Protocol is not constrained to 
intentional damage, but also outlaws purely incidental damage which “may be 
expected” to occur.99 On the other hand, it must be recalled that, whereas the 
ENMOD prohibition is violated as soon as the damage is either widespread, 
long-lasting “or” severe, the Protocol requires that all three criteria are ful/ lled 
cumulatively, implying that the AP I provisions set a higher “e{ ects” threshold. 
Furthermore, ENMOD and AP I award di{ erent interpretations to the 
identical terms.100 ) e Understanding of the  ENMOD Convention, referred to 
above, expressly indicates that the de/ nitions enshrined therein are intended 
exclusively for the purpose of the  ENMOD Convention and do not prejudice 
the interpretation of provisions in other international agreements. Indeed, 
AP I adopts a radically di{ erent approach when it comes to the “long-term” 
nature of environmental damage. According to the travaux préparatoires the 
latter term should be understood in terms of decades, rather than months or a 
season, thus signi/ cantly raising the bar to the point where the prohibition will 
be inapplicable in most cases.101 ) e term “widespread”, on the other hand, is 
interpreted similar to the ENMOD Understanding. Finally, the precise meaning 
of the adjective “severe” in Articles 35(3) and 55 AP I remains unclear. Clearly, 
the fact of having two di{ erent texts with di{ ering yardsticks, the precise 
98 Y. Dinstein, supra note 17, 182.
99 S. Oeter, supra note 6, 127–128.
100 A. Bouvier, “Protection of the  natural  environment in time of armed con+ ict”, 31 Int’l Rev. 
 Red Cross 1991, 575–576.
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operational implications of which are far from clear, is anything but an optimal 
situation in terms of providing belligerent parties with clear and accessible rules.
Despite the fact that both ENMOD and the provisions of AP I may have 
contributed to a better protection of the  environment in times of war, many 
authors feel the existing legal framework remains woefully inadequate. ) eir 
criticism seems at least partially justi/ ed, as the limited scope of the  ENMOD 
Convention and the high threshold of AP I leave signi/ cant leeway for 
intentional and direct damage to the  environment, all of which may fully fall 
within the boundaries of currently existing law on the matter. ) is becomes clear 
when we apply the respective criteria to the 1991  Gulf War. During the latter 
con+ ict, Saddam Hussein, acting in a / nal de/ ant gesture, ordered his troops to 
release large quantities of oil into the  Persian Gulf by opening the valves of oil 
terminals, causing the largest oil spill ever. Furthermore, over 600 Kuwaiti oil 
wells were set ablaze, resulting in huge smoke plumes and heavy atmospheric 
pollution. Yet, this conduct does not seem to violate the prescriptions of the 
 ENMOD Convention, as it did not involve any deliberate manipulation of 
natural processes.102 Neither was the damage “long-lasting” in the sense of AP 
I, given the fact that it took less than a year to extinguish the / res and to clean 
up the oil spills. Hence, it turns out to be impossible to qualify these activities as 
unlawful as per the speci/ c protection granted under the law of armed con+ ict 
to the  natural  environment. Be that as it may, it may however be possible to 
qualify them as unlawful as per the general rules of the law of armed con+ ict. As 
far as the latter are concerned, indeed, the acts could arguably be considered to 
have violated the basic  principle of  military necessity, as they were by and large 
motivated by a desire for revenge. Even if one would concede that the behaviour 
was aimed at hindering an invasion from the sea or impeding target acquisition 
by  enemy planes, the damage in+ icted would arguably be clearly excessive.
) e legal lacunae exposed by the 1991  Gulf War led to calls to expand the 
scope of the  ENMOD Convention and even to proposals of a / < h Geneva 
Convention dealing speci/ cally with the  environment.103 Others have begun to 
examine to what extent it is possible to borrow from international environmental 
law proper to remedy the shortcomings of IHL in this context.104 In 2011, the 
International Law Commission decided to include the “protection of the 
 environment in relation to armed con+ icts” in its programme of work, with a 
view to clarifying the international legal framework governing the protection of 
102 L. Edgerton, “Eco- terrorist acts during the  Persian  Gulf War: Is international law su  cient 
to hold  Iraq liable?”, 22 Ga. J. Int’ l & Comp. L. 1992, 172.
103 See M.N. Schmitt, supra note 92, 22–35. Further: G. Plant (ed.), Environmental protection 
and the law of war: a ‘Fi* h Geneva’ convention on the protection of the  environment in time of 
armed con! ict, London, Belhaven Press, 1992, 284.
104 See e.g., M. Bothe, C. Bruch, J. Diamond and D. Jensen, “International law protecting the 
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the  environment before, during and a< er an armed con+ ict.105 However, apart 
from a few declaratory or recommendatory documents, these calls and initiatives 
have borne little fruit until now.106 As a result, the practical impact of the various 
provisions in terms of actually outlawing particular methods of warfare remains 
unclear, and in any event doubtful, up to this day. Again in 2000 for example, the 
Committee established by the ICTY prosecutor to review the  NATO bombing 
campaign against the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia concluded in its / nal report 
that the threshold of Articles 35 and 55 AP I was so high as to make it di  cult 
to / nd a violation.107 Clearly, States have preferred to remain quite open-ended 
as to the permissible scope of activities when it comes to activities a{ ecting the 
 natural  environment.
Another subject of disagreement concerns the question whether 
Articles 35(3) and 55 AP I and the  ENMOD Convention are part of  customary 
international law. Several authors reject this approach on the grounds that 
the various provisions constituted new law at the time of their adoption and 
prohibit  methods of combat which in  principle could be justi/ ed as militarily 
necessary.108 In the  Nuclear  Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ appears to 
have followed the latter approach with regard to the Protocol provisions.109 ) e 
United States, the  United Kingdom and  France have, moreover, on a number of 
occasions rejected the customary character of Articles 35(3) and 55, in particular 
with regard to  nuclear  weapons.110 On the other hand, several States considered 
the rules to be customary in their submissions to the ICJ in the  Nuclear  Weapons 
case.111 ) e Committee established to review the  NATO bombing campaign 
suggested likewise (§15 of the Final Report). Moreover, the practice of the 
three objecting countries is far from consistent. During the 1991  Gulf War, for 
example, the United States and the  United Kingdom accused  Iraq of violating 
Articles 35(3) and 55 AP I, although  Iraq had never rati/ ed the Protocol. Taking 
into account the con+ icting evidence, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck for their 
part conclude that Articles 35(3) and 55 AP I are norms of customary character 
with regard to international, and arguably also non-international armed 
con+ icts, although 1) the United States is a persistent objector to the rule and 
2)  France and the  United Kingdom are persistent objectors with regard to their 
105 See e.g., ILC, Report on the work of its sixty-/ < h session, 2013, UN Doc. A/68/10, 105–107.
106 E.g. UNGA Resolution 47/37 of 25  November 1992. See also the Guidelines for Military 
Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the  Environment in Times of Armed Con+ ict, 
in 78 Int’l Rev.  Red Cross 1996, 230–237.
107 See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established to review the  NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia of 13 June 2000, 39 ILM 2000, 
§§14 et seq.
108 S. Oeter, supra note 6, 215–216; Y. Dinstein, supra note 17, 185.
109 ICJ, Legality of the # reat or  Use of  Nuclear  Weapons, supra note 4, §31.
110 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 153–4.
111 Ibid., 152, footnote 55 (referring to the oral pleadings and/or written statements of New 
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application to the  use of  nuclear  weapons.112 In all fairness, it must be concluded 
that, as far as the question whether these provisions have been raised to the 
level of  customary international law is concerned, defendable arguments can be 
invoked in either direction.
Causing “widespread, long-term and  severe  damage to the  natural 
 environment” may moreover constitute a war crime in the sense of Article 8(2)
(b)(iv) ICC Statute. To this end, it is not su  cient that the damage is intended or 
expected as set forth in the Protocol. ) e ICC Statute applies a higher threshold 
by demanding both intent and knowledge. Moreover, for a war crime to take 
place, the damage must also be clearly excessive in relation to the direct overall 
 military advantage anticipated.
Other than the  natural  environment qualifying as a civilian object – and 
bene/ ting from all provisions pertaining to the  general  protection of  civilian 
objects – its speci/ c protection remains cursory and patchy at best under the 
present day law of armed con+ ict.
2.5. REGULATION OF CERTAIN OTHER ACTIVITIES
Apart from the principles spelled out in the previous sections, the law of armed 
con+ ict contains numerous other provisions regarding certain other methods 
of warfare. A comprehensive overview falls beyond the scope of the present 
contribution.
Some of these provisions are connected to speci/ c types of warfare that 
have been historically resorted to at the strategic or operational level. Examples 
are the rules on  naval warfare, which deal with  prize and  contraband, and the 
creation of naval blockades or  submarine warfare. ) e relevant rules governing 
maritime hostilities are spread over various instruments belonging to the realm 
of the law of armed con+ ict, but have recently been brought together in the San 
Remo Manual,113 an informal expert-driven restatement of existing law in the 
area of  naval warfare. Although non-binding in nature, the Manual provides 
an important restatement of existing law, together with some progressive 
development (as compared to the 1949 Geneva Conventions) in light of recent 
state practice and technological innovations.
A second category of such rules is linked to the principles on targeting 
and  distinction. Examples hereof are the prohibition to attack non-defended 
towns or villages,114 rules pertaining to “ human shields”115 or the prohibition 
112 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 151–158.
113 L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed 
Con! icts at Sea, Cambridge, CUP, 2005, 257 (prepared by the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law).
114 Art. 25 Hague Regulations; Art. 59 AP I.
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of what is commonly referred to as “carpet bombing”, also o< en termed “ area 
 bombardment”.116 Other restrictions on the methods of warfare are derived 
from the general requirements of respect for  human dignity and  humane 
treatment of the civilian population. Concrete examples hereof are the rules 
proscribing slavery,117  enforced prostitution or  rape.118 Although such conduct 
may qualify, provided the speci/ c conditions set out in the ICC Statute have been 
met, as a crime against humanity,119 many recent con+ icts, especially those of 
a non-international armed nature involving non-state organised armed groups, 
regrettably illustrate that the rules are still too o< en honoured in the breach. In 
what follows, a number of methods of warfare will be dealt in a somewhat more 
in–depth manner.
2.5.1. Espionage
According to Article 24 of the Hague Regulations, the employment of measures 
necessary for obtaining information about the  enemy is considered permissible. 
Absent an explicit prohibition, acts of espionage are therefore not forbidden 
under the international law of armed con+ ict, and as such do not constitute 
a violation of this (international) legal framework. ) is was recognised by 
the Dutch Special Court of Cassation in the 1949 Flesche case: “[Espionage] 
is a recognized means of warfare and therefore is neither an international 
delinquency on the part of the State employing the spy nor a war crime proper 
on the part of the individual concerned.”120 In any armed con+ ict, being 
able to gather information of military value about one’s  enemy is of prime 
importance, thus it is only logical that States have never considered espionage as 
impermissible as a matter of public international law.
) e  de/ nition of a “spy” is relatively narrow, in that, pursuant to Article 29 
Hague Regulations, “a person can only be considered a spy when, acting 
clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information 
in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it 
to the hostile party”. Furthermore, Article 46(2) and (3) AP I drastically limit the 
scope of individuals who can be considered as  spies, by excluding, for instance, 
any person gathering information while “in the  uniform of his  armed forces” 
(emphasis added).121
116 Art. 51(5)(a) AP I. See also J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 45, 
referring to the declaration made by the USA during the  negotiations of AP I, to which it is 
subscribed here, that the words “clearly separated and distinct  military objectives” require a 
distance “at least su  ciently large to permit the individual  military objectives to be attacked 
separately”.
117 Art. 4(2)(f) AP II.
118 Art. 27 GC IV; Art. 76 AP I; Art. 4(2)(e) AP II.
119 E.g. Art. 7(c) and (g) ICC Statute.
120 Special Court of Cassation of the  Netherlands, In re Flesche, 27 June 1949, 16 Ann. Dig. 1949, 
267. Consider also: G.D. Solis, supra note 6, 224.
121 In a similar vein,  military  aircra<  on overt missions of information gathering shall not 
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 Spies nevertheless enjoy an unfavourable position in time of armed 
con+ ict.122 Indeed, Articles  29–31 Hague Regulations and Article  46 AP I 
indicate that captured  spies are exposed to prosecution and  punishment in 
accordance with the law of the belligerent party capturing them, i.e. under the 
domestic legal framework of the latter. ) ey are not entitled to the protective 
regime for POWs. ) us, if the domestic legal framework of the belligerent party 
having captured a spy provides for this type of  punishment, they may even be 
sentenced to death for engaging in espionage, although – arguably on the basis of 
Article 75 AP I – no  punishment may be imposed without a proper trial meeting 
the standards of that provision.
Espionage can be undertaken by  combatants and  civilians alike. On the 
basis of Article 29 of the Hague Regulations, three cumulative ingredients can 
be discerned.123 Firstly, the acts must have taken place behind  enemy lines. ) is 
not only refers to the actual zone of operations of a hostile army, but to the whole 
territory occupied or controlled by the adverse party. Yet, the limitation of what 
is considered by the law of armed con+ ict as “espionage” pertains to the fact that 
it only relates to persons operating behind  enemy lines.124 Secondly, espionage 
involves the gathering or transmitting of information of military value for the 
bene/ t of the other side. Last but not least, the acts must have been carried out 
clandestinely or under false pretences. With regard to  combatants, this implies 
that the person gathering information was acting in disguise, for example by 
assuming a false civilian identity or by wearing  enemy or neutral uniforms. 
) us, as previously indicated,  combatants wearing the regular  uniform of their 
own  armed forces do not become  spies. ) ey may be / red upon (since they are 
 combatants), but have to be awarded POW status when taken prisoner. ) us, 
based upon the cumulative application of these three criteria, quite a number of 
 intelligence gathering activities that are regularly carried out in time of armed 
con+ ict by no means qualify as “espionage” as this term is understood under the 
law of armed con+ ict.
As mentioned before, while the international law of armed con+ ict does not 
consider espionage unlawful as per this legal framework, let alone consider this 
a war crime, captured  spies may be prosecuted in accordance with the national 
criminal legislation of the captor State. However, when combatant  spies are 
captured a< er rejoining the army to which they belong, they can no longer be 
prosecuted for espionage, but instead have to be treated as POWs. Moreover, 
in occupied territories, resident  combatants can only be treated as  spies when 
air and missile warfare, New York, CUP, 2013, Rule 123; K. Ipsen, “ Combatants and  non-
 combatants”, in D. Fleck (ed.), supra note 6, 325.
122 G.B. Demarest, “Espionage in international law”, 24 Denver J. Int’ l L. & Pol’y 1995–1996, 
337–338.
123 See Y. Dinstein, supra note 6, 241–242.; J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), 
supra note 4, 390.
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they are caught in the act. Civilian  spies, on the other hand, cannot invoke 
any dispensation and remain liable for prior acts of espionage regardless of the 
circumstances of capture.125
Even if they are not “ spies” in the technical sense and absent express 
provisions to this end in treaty law, the situation of saboteurs is largely 
analogous.126 ) us, acts of destruction carried out behind  enemy lines are in 
 principle lawful under the law of armed con+ ict, provided they are directed 
against  military objectives and, in accordance with the applicable legal 
framework regulating the conduct of hostilities, feasible precautions are taken 
to avoid, or in any event minimise,  collateral damage. However, upon capture, 
civilian saboteurs and military saboteurs not in  uniform are liable to prosecution 
under national criminal law.127 Unlike uniformed combatant saboteurs they do 
no bene/ t from the protective POW regime.
2.5.2.  Denial of Quarter
) e law of armed con+ ict has long condemned the practice of declaring that 
no  surrender will be accepted and that there shall be no survivors. “ Denial 
of quarter” was forbidden in the 1863  Lieber Code, as in Article  23(d) Hague 
Regulations. A clear violation of the rule took place when Hitler adopted the 
notorious Kommandobefehl, according to which  enemy commandos were not 
to be taken prisoner. ) is practice was subsequently condemned as a war crime 
by the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg. ) e rule enshrined in 
Article  23(d) Hague Regulations is strengthened by Article  40 AP I128 which 
not only reiterates the prohibition to declare that there shall be no survivors, 
but also forbids the threat thereof or the conduct of hostilities on this basis. ) is 
prohibition has to be linked to two important corollaries, which are expressed in 
Articles 41 and 42 AP I. ) e former addresses enemies  hors de combat, the latter 
deals with occupants of  aircra< .
According to Article  41 AP I, enemies who are recognised or who, in the 
circumstances, ought to be recognised to be  hors de combat, shall not be made the 
object of attack. ) e protective regime for individuals  hors de combat is not limited 
to lawful  combatants, but extends to all persons directly taking part in hostilities, 
including  civilians taking a direct part in hostilities,  mercenaries,  spies and 
saboteurs. ) ree di{ erent categories, as set out in Article 41(2) AP I, are envisaged: 
persons who are in the power of the adverse party; persons who are defenceless 
because of unconsciousness, wounds or sickness (inasmuch as they refrain from 
any  hostile act); and anyone who clearly indicates an intention to  surrender.
125 Special Court of Cassation of the  Netherlands, In re Flesche, supra note 120, 272.
126 L. Green, supra note 82, 150.
127 Consider, e.g., US Supreme Court, Ex parte Quirin et al., 1942, 317 US 1, 35–36.
128 As to non-international armed con+ icts covered by AP II, the last sentence of Art. 4(1) thereof 
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As to the second category, it must be understood that the law of armed 
con+ ict has a rather speci/ c understanding of what it means to be “ hors de 
combat”. It means, in fact, exactly what it says: a given person is no longer able 
at all to / ght (“defenceless”).129 Hence, a person who has been  wounded but still 
manages to continue to / ght, e.g. pulling the trigger of his weapon, cannot be 
considered  hors de combat. ) is person, however, may still qualify as  wounded 
or  sick in the sense of the Geneva Conventions, provided he refrains from any 
act of hostility.
) e third prong (“clearly [indicating] an intention to  surrender”)130 can 
possibly be abused, in which case the act in question may qualify as  per/ dy 
according to Article 37(a) AP I. Intent to  surrender can be expressed in a variety 
of ways, for example by laying down one’s  weapons and raising one’s hands, or 
by displaying a  + ag of truce. As unequivocally stated in Article 41 AP I, these 
persons cannot be attacked. It is a di{ erent matter altogether, however, as to 
whether there is an obligation for the  enemy to actually capture a person which 
has indicated a clear intention to  surrender and, depending on the circumstances 
of the case, accord a protective status such as POW status. It is argued here 
that the answer shall be in the negative: the person indicating an intention to 
 surrender cannot be attacked, but will not necessarily (have to) be captured 
either. ) e question as to whether or not to capture this person remains entirely 
within the discretion of the adversary.131
) e  immunity from attack granted to a person belonging to one of the 
three categories expires when he or she engages in hostile acts or attempts to 
 escape, i.e. when that person is no longer genuinely  hors de combat in the way in 
which this notion is understood by the law of armed con+ ict. However, POWs 
attempting to  escape should only be / red upon as an extreme measure, a< er 
appropriate warnings have been given.132 Finally, throughout, it must be kept 
in mind that, when an  enemy feigns being  hors de combat and subsequently 
attempts to kill, injure or capture his adversary, he not only loses his privileged 
status, but may also commit an act of  per/ dy (see supra), for which he may – 
129 It has been suggested in the academic literature that the alleged US policy of conducting 
so-called “secondary” drone strikes or “follow-up” strikes on  wounded survivors of / rst 
 attacks may be hard to reconcile with the prohibition against  denial of quarter. See, e.g., 
N. Melzer, “ Human Rights implications of the usage of drones and unmanned robots in 
warfare”, May 2013, Section 3.1.4, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
etudes/join/2013/410220/EXPO-DROI_ET(2013)410220_EN.pdf [accessed on 17  July 2015]. 
 Attacks against humanitarian personnel attempting to rescue the injured are of course 
prohibited.
130 For an illustration, see  Inter-American Commission on  Human Rights, Report No. 55/97, Case 
No. 11.137:  Argentina, OEA/ Ser/L/V/II.98, Doc. 38, December 6 rev., 1997, §§182–185 (the 
Commission concluded that there was insu  cient evidence to hold that Argentinian forces 
purposefully rejected a  surrender attempt).
131 ) e view, as propounded here, is largely followed in J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-
Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 168.
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providing the particular conditions for criminal  liability have been met – be 
tried as a war criminal.
A second speci/ c area in which the duty to give quarter manifests itself 
concerns the rule that persons parachuting from an  aircra<  in distress may not 
be attacked during their descent, regardless of whether they may be expected to 
land in territory controlled by their own party (i.e. when, ultimately, it is likely 
that they will be able to continue to / ght from there on) or in territory controlled 
by the adverse party. Upon landing, they must be awarded an opportunity to 
 surrender before being made the object of attack, unless it is apparent that they 
are engaging in hostile acts. If the person having parachuted from the  aircra<  
in distress attempts to evade capture by the adversary, this person shall not 
be considered as being  hors de combat, i.e. this person can be attacked from 
that moment onwards. Again, this rule applies to all the “ shipwrecked in the 
air”,133 civilian and  combatants alike. However, given their combat training 
and mission, airborne troops (i.e. persons not parachuting from an  aircra<  in 
distress, one of the key conditions of Article 42(2) AP I) are expressly excluded 
from this speci/ c protection and remain liable to attack lest they clearly indicate 
their intention to  surrender.
Each of the three rules spelled out above has been established as a norm of 
 customary international law applicable in international armed con+ icts.134
2.5.3. Seizure and Destruction of  Enemy Property135
In situations of land warfare,  customary international law accepts that 
belligerent parties are entitled, for whatever reason and even for no reason at all, 
to seize all movable public property belonging to the  enemy State and captured 
on the battle/ eld as so-called “ booty of war”.136 ) is obviously holds true 
for objects such as  weapons and ammunition, yet it also holds true for objects 
which are not necessarily of a military character, such as means of transport 
and communication, money and food supplies, provided they belong to the 
 enemy State.137 An exception is made for  submarine cables, which may not be 
seized except in the case of absolute necessity and on the condition that they are 
restored and compensated a< er the war.138 Even  medical units and supplies may 
133 Phrase used e.g. in the 1987 Commentary to the First Additional Protocol, Y. Sandoz et 
al.  (eds.), supra note 3, 495, §1636; J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra 
note 4, 171.
134 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 161–172.
135 Further: B.B. Jia, “‘Protected Property’ and its protection in international humanitarian law”, 
15 Leiden J. Int’ l L. 2002, 131–153.
136 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 173–175. ) e present chapter 
obviously does not address issues of possible  liability under the  jus ad bellum. See on this: 
 Eritrea  Ethiopia Claims Commission, Final Award,  Ethiopia’s Damages Claims, 17  August 
2009, §§271 et seq.
137 Art. 53 Hague Regulations.
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be seized as booty, as long as the care of the  wounded and  sick is guaranteed.139 
As indicated, the concept of “ booty of war” is con/ ned to public property 
belonging to the  enemy. Private  enemy property may in  principle not be seized: 
on the basis of Article  33(2) GC IV, “ pillage is prohibited”.140 Like  civilians, 
 enemy POWs must moreover be allowed to keep all their personal belongings.141
) e rules on the lawful seizure of  booty of war must be read in conjunction 
with the general  principle, enshrined in Article  23(g) Hague Regulations, 
prohibiting the destruction or seizure of  enemy property, “unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”, as 
well as the  principle, enshrined in Article 38 GC IV requiring that “the situation 
of  protected persons shall continue to be regulated, in  principle by the provisions 
concerning  aliens in time of peace”.142 In occupied territories, requisitioning, i.e. 
the taking of necessities from a population for the use of the occupying army 
is accepted to some degree, although it must be proportionate to what the area 
can provide and must take the needs of the population into account.143 Goods 
requisitioned from private individuals must moreover be restored and/or 
compensated at the conclusion of the war.
By demanding a reasonable connection with the aim of overcoming the 
 enemy, the rule prohibits the destruction of public or private property as an end 
in itself. As a result, residential buildings may be destroyed as part of military 
operations but not as a punitive measure. Extensive destruction or appropriation 
of property, not justi/ ed by  military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly, moreover constitutes a grave breach of Article 147 GC IV. Under the 
provisions of the ICC Statute, destruction or seizure of  enemy property not 
justi/ ed by  military necessity can also be prosecuted as a war crime, both in 
international and non-international armed con+ icts.144
 Booty of war becomes the property of the captor State, not of the 
individual who seizes it. ) e same goes for goods requisitioned from the 
civilian population. Soldiers are, however, not permitted to take home any 
“war trophies”’. In this context, as indicated, lawful seizure of  war booty must 
139 Arts. 33 and 35 GC I.
140 ) e  distinction between public and private property may, however, not always be easy to 
make. Consider e.g., Israeli Supreme Court, Al Nawar v. Minister of Defence, et al., H.C. (High 
Court) 574/82, reprinted in F. Domb, “Judgments of the Supreme Court of  Israel”, 16  Israel 
Yb. On  Human Rights, 321–328 (on the seizure by Israeli forces of machines and an enterprise 
in  Lebanon allegedly belonging to the PLO).
141 Art. 4 Hague Regulations; Art. 18(1) GC III.
142 On the latter  principle, see  Eritrea  Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award,  Civilians 
Claims,  Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27–32, 17  December 2004, §§123–151 (“If private 
property of  enemy nationals is to be frozen or otherwise impaired in wartime, it must be done 
by the State, and under conditions providing for the property’s protection and its eventual 
disposition by return to the owners or through post-war agreement.”).
143 Art. 52 Hague Regulations; T. Goltz, “ Pillage”, in R. Gutman, D.S. Rieff and K. Anderson 
(eds.), Crimes of war: what the public should know, New York, Norton, 1999, 276.
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be distinguished from unlawful “ pillage” (or plunder) which has to do with 
the unlawful seizure of private property. ) e latter term refers to the forcible 
taking of private property by an invading or conquering army from the  enemy’s 
subjects for private or personal use.145 Numerous provisions of the law of armed 
con+ ict proscribe  pillage in speci/ c situations, for example  pillage of  wounded 
and  sick  combatants,  pillage of the  dead,  pillage of  wounded and  sick  civilians, 
 pillage in occupied territories or  pillage directed against  cultural property.146 
Article 28 Hague Regulations moreover bans  pillage of towns and other places, 
even in assault. Such conduct is sanctioned as a war crime according to the ICC 
Statute.147 Last but not least, Article 33 GC IV outlaws  pillage in general terms. 
In spite of these clear norms,  pillage is no rare phenomenon in contemporary 
armed con+ icts. It was widely practiced in the war between Abkhaz separatists 
and the new government of  Georgia in 1992 and 1993.148 And in the DRC v. 
 Uganda case, the ICJ found that  Uganda had violated its duty of vigilance by not 
taking adequate measures to prevent the widespread looting, plundering and 
exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources.149
2.5.4.  Forced Labour,  Deportation and  Intimidation
Finally, mention can be made of three particular types of methods of warfare. 
) e / rst concerns measures of  intimidation against the civilian population, 
for example in order to secure obedience of an occupied people or to hasten 
 surrender. ) us, “measures of  intimidation or of terrorism” are explicitly 
declared as prohibited by Article 33(1) GC IV. ) is provision prohibits measures 
(which do not necessarily need to qualify as “ attacks” in the sense of Article 49(1) 
AP I, see supra) that have as their primary objective to create panic among the 
population – for example a precision strike in a busy shopping street – even 
if the  attacks do not result in any loss of life. Furthermore, no violation of the 
rule occurs when the  intimidation is only an incidental by-product of an attack 
against a military objective or the result of genuine warnings (taken as part of 
the “precautions–in- attacks requirement”, see supra) of impending  attacks on 
such objectives.150 Furthermore, Article 51(2) AP I prohibits “acts or threats of 
145 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), supra note 4, 185.
146 Art. 15 GC I; Art. 18 GC II; Art. 16 GC IV; Art. 5 (4) Hague Convention for the Protection of 
 Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con+ ict of 14 May 1954 (Compendium 158); Art. 47 
Hague Regulations.
147 Art.  8(2)(b)(xvi) and (2)(e)(v) ICC Statute. Further: H. Boddens Hosang, “Pillaging: 
article 8(2)(b)(xvi)” in R.S.K. Lee (ed.), # e  International Criminal Court: elements of crimes 
and rules of procedure and evidence, Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 2001, 167–177.
148 See: T. Goltz, supra note 143.
149 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.  Uganda), 19 December 2005, ICJ 
Rep. 2005, 168, §§242–245. See further, on the unlawful exploitation of natural resources in 
armed con+ ict:
 P.J. Keenan, “Con+ ict minerals and the law of  pillage”, 14 Chicago J. Int’ l L. 2014, 524–558.
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violence the primary purpose of which is to spread  terror among the civilian 
population”. Two closely related rules are those banning collective  punishment 
and the  taking of  hostages.151  Israel has repeatedly been accused of engaging 
in  intimidation and collective  punishment vis-à-vis the Palestinian territories. 
) us, the UN  Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza in its 2009 report concluded that 
 Israel’s conduct during Operation “Cast Lead” involved collective  punishment 
and “measures of  intimidation and terrorism”.152 And in a 2010 press release, 
the ICRC stated that the  blockade imposed on the Gaza strip amounted to a 
collective punishing of “[t]he whole of Gaza’s civilian population […] for acts 
for which they bear no responsibility” in clear violation of IHL.153 By contrast, 
for its part, in a judgment of 2014 concerning the demolition of the houses of 
suspected terrorists and their family members, the Israeli Supreme Court 
implied that collective  punishment can be permissible if there is a su  ciently 
weighty deterring purpose.154
Forced  deportation155 constitutes a “‘method” of warfare that is of particular 
historical signi/ cance. Following the horrors of the  Second World War, the 
Nuremberg Tribunal de/ ned individual or mass deportations as  war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.156 Nevertheless, forced  deportation was also 
practiced in more recent con+ icts.157 In 1992 for example, Serbian forces tried 
to deport hundreds of Bosnians to  Austria.158 ) e issue of forced  deportation 
is now dealt with in Article  49(1) GC IV159, though it must be clearly kept in 
mind that this provision only applies to occupied territory. ) is provision deals 
with the prohibition of individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations 
both of inhabitants of occupied territory outside the occupied territory as well 
as transfers of parts of the  Occupying Power’s civilian population into occupied 
territory. ) e concept of premeditated forced  deportation must be distinguished 
from (possibly widespread)  displacement caused by the general climate of 
151 Arts. 33 and 34 GC IV; Art. 75 AP I; Art. 4 AP II.
152 Report of the UN  Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Con+ ict, “ Human Rights in  Palestine 
and other Occupied Arab Territories”, 25 September 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, §§60, 74, 
91, 1171, 1320, 1457 & 1494.
153 ICRC, “Gaza closure: not another year!”, 14 June 2010, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/update/ palestine-update-140610.htm [accessed on 27 July 2015].
154 Israeli Supreme Court, Qawasmeh et al., 11 August 2014, HCJ 5290/14, 5295/14, 5300/14.
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156 See also Arts. 7(1)(d) and 8(2)(a)(vii) ICC Statute.
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insecurity in armed con+ ict.160 It must also be clearly distinguished from the 
notion of “ evacuation”.  Evacuation is only permitted when the security of the 
population or imperative military reasons so demand, and on the condition that 
the evacuees are transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area 
have ceased. Article  17 AP II provides for a similarly inspired prohibition of 
forced movement of  civilians in the context of non-international armed con+ icts 
reaching the threshold of applicability of AP II.
160 See e.g., Independent  International  Fact-Finding Mission on the Con+ ict in  Georgia, Report, 
Volume I, §§120–125.
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